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Abstract.  
 
Objective: This is the first in a series of articles to characterize and critically consider recently employed 
forms of conscience sensitive psychiatric treatment of children and adolescents.  
Method:  Modules were designed based upon domains of conscience functioning identified in empirical 
research and applied to recognized benchmarks for interventions in the treatment of psychopathology.  
Each module was designed to be sufficiently complete such that full participation from persons entering the 
cycle of modules at any point would not be compromised.  One of the authors paired with interested, 
experienced therapists in existing programs to conduct and refine interventions in a group psycho-
educational therapy format.  
Results: Over one hundred and fifty hours of conscience sensitive psycho-educational group therapy were 
conducted in therapeutic loci within a well-established, community-based continuum of care.  The 
therapeutic loci ranged from a child and adolescent psychiatry outpatient clinic to a closed youth residential 
setting and included adolescent psychiatric intensive outpatient and partial hospitalization programs.  
Number of participants in any module varied from one in the outpatient locus to fifteen in the intensive 
outpatient locus.  Age of participants varied from school age to late adolescent.  Formal intellectual testing 
was not uniformly available for participants.  Most however appeared to be average intellectually.  Each 
participant had, at minimum, an initial assessment by a mental health clinician yielding a DSM IV 
multiaxial psychiatric diagnosis.  No restrictions were placed upon participants in terms of principal or 
secondary diagnoses or severity of impairment although all had sufficiently severe impairment to be 
deemed in need of the aforementioned current and standard psychiatric or psychosocial interventions.  
Length of time for each of the seven modules was permitted to vary according to the stability of the 
participant population.  Individual modules conducted in the adolescent psychiatric intensive outpatient 
program were limited to one hour each, whereas some modules conducted in the residential and youth day 
school settings extended over several sessions held once weekly.  Seven modules were eventually 
developed and refined to comprise a full course of conscience sensitive psycho-educational group therapy.  
Conclusions: Each of the seven modules in its current stage of development and refinement is 
characterized in terms of praxis, but also considered critically in terms of treatment philosophy.  
Conscience sensitive group psycho-educational therapy can be conducted in child adolescent psychiatric 
therapeutic loci ranging from outpatient to closed residential programs.  Constraining variables were 
encountered in the adolescent intensive outpatient program when census became large, and turnover rapid, 
in consequence of which the full cycle of seven modules conducted at a frequency of one per week could 
not be completed by many participants.  This could be remedied by conducting sessions more frequently, 
perhaps two to three times per week, and offering a sufficient number of groups to ensure that the number 
of participants in each group does not exceed eight.  In the outpatient setting, there were fewer referrals 
than had been hoped, perhaps because of limitations upon reimbursement for the total number and/or kind 
of therapeutic interventions, a condition which, in the local mental health community, favors individual 
psychotherapy over group psychotherapy.  However, the possibility cannot be excluded that there have 
been referral biases or parental preferences in favor of groups with a more readily recognizable focus such 
as anger management or social skills over a novel, less familiar approach. 
Conscience Works: Theory, Research and Clinical Applications, 2005, 1(1): 1- 23.  
Key Words: conscience sensitive, child and adolescent psychiatry, benchmarks for intervention, psycho-
educational, group format.  
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Introduction.   
 
  Current practice parameters for psychiatric assessment of children and adolescents (see outline 
form III E 9) specify that the parent interview should address, as part of the developmental history in the 
context of the family,  “Conscience and Values”: 
 
    a.  Assess conscience in terms of:  
         (1) Age appropriate development,  
         (2) Specific areas of harshness, laxness, or conflict;    
 (3) Effectiveness in helping child conform to expected family and  
community norms; 
     b. Religious or ethical concerns; 
     c. Goals and future aspirations: 
  (1) How realistic; 
  (2) How congruent with family's values and expectations. 
          
A recursive procedure is embedded in the parameters pertaining to the child interview (see outline 
form IV C 4) insofar as the "[s]tructure of the child interview includes, as developmentally appropriate, in 
flexible order:   … 
  (4) Major realms of functioning (as outlined in developmental history) 
  … 
  
(American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Practice Parameters, 1997). 
 
 The practice parameters are mute on the subject of how these tasks are to be accomplished and what occurs 
in actual practice is a current mystery.  Older practitioners in child and adolescent psychiatry will recall the 
prior gold standard for the mental status examination of a child did not refer to 'conscience' per se, but to 
the psychoanalytic construct of superego, subsuming ego ideals and values, and their integration into the 
personality (Simmons, 1987).  Some practitioners may be influenced by Kohlbergian cognitive 
developmental approaches to moral judgment (Gibbs, 1995; Gibbs, Potter and Goldstein, 1995; Lapsley, 
1996; Wolff, 2002) They may then integrate their impressions of how a youth handles moral dilemmas 
hypothetically posed (or emerging in conversation) with historical data culled from the interviews of the 
parent and the child.  Descriptors (examples may be found in Gibbs, et al.; 1995 and Lickona, 1983) may 
then be applied which are consonant, more or less, with formal stages in moral cognitive development.  To 
the extent that the practitioner is attuned to moral emotionality, cognitive developmental descriptors may be 
supplemented by global impressions of empathic responsiveness (or the lack thereof) à la Hoffman 
(Damon, 1988; Hoffman, 1991; Lapsley, 1996; Wolff, 2002).  Some clinicians may have been influenced 
by integrative perspectives represented in the literature (Navàez and Rest, 1995; Eisenberg, 1995).  Still 
other practitioners may rely upon items endorsed by parents on dimensional ratings of youth 
psychopathology (e.g. The Child Behavior Checklist, Achenbach, 1985) or parent interview questions 
modeled upon such items.  It is noteworthy that several of these items call for an interpretation of affect, for 
example:  'lacks remorse', and  'doesn't experience guilt after misbehaving.'   
 
Conscience Sensitive Assessment and Diagnosis 
 
Stages of conscience formation and domains of conscience functioning have been identified based 
upon empirical research conducted in the 1980's with relatively advantaged youth of a Midwestern state, 
ages 5-17 (Stilwell & Galvin, 1985; Stilwell, et al., 1991; 1994; 1996; 1997; 1998).  These stages and 
domains have also been found to have broader applicability to similar aged youth with adverse life 
circumstances in the form of maltreatment and natural catastrophe.  Seriously, emotionally disturbed boys 
in a state hospital who had endured early maltreatment were apt to have more developmental delays in 
conscience formation and more psychopathological interference in conscience functioning than either their 
relatively advantaged counterparts or other seriously emotionally disturbed boys in hospital who had been 
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spared from the experience of early maltreatment (Galvin, Stilwell, Shekhar, Kopta, McKasson and Carl, 
1997).  In contrast, youth who survived an earthquake that devastated Spitak, Armenia in 1988 
demonstrated a mix of accelerations in conscience formation and psychopathological interference in 
conscience functioning (Goenjian, Stilwell, Steinberg, Fairbanks, Galvin, Karayan, 1999).  From these 
researches, as well as ongoing clinical and teaching experiences, evolved a theory of conscience, which can 
be distilled to three concepts: invariant hierarchical stages, interdependent domains and intrinsic values.  
The basic ideas of conscience sensitive psychiatric interview techniques built upon research experience 
with the Stilwell Conscience Interview (SCI) and conscience sensitive multiaxial diagnosis in maltreated 
children and adolescents have been put forth in this journal (Galvin, Stilwell, Adinamis & Kohn, 2001).  A 
global assessment rating scale of psychopathological interference in conscience functioning has also been 
developed to assist in treatment planning (Stilwell, 2003).   
 
 
Conscience Sensitive Treatment Planning and Treatment 
 
In general, one has the expectation that if competencies, delays and deficiencies are to be assessed 
in any particular developmental domain, the assessment is conducted for the sake of planning and carrying 
out effective treatment or providing necessary services.  In accordance with this general expectation-even if 
'conscience' is not explicitly mentioned- moral developmental interventions have indeed been included by 
many clinicians and clinical theoreticians among their therapeutic desiderata.  As a first consideration, what 
has been written about raising and educating youth in a manner informed by moral developmental 
psychology (Berkowitz, 1997,1998; Coles, 1997; Damon, 1988; Lickona, 1983; Stilwell, Galvin and Kopta, 
2001) and also what has been written about fostering moral philosophical development in youth -even in 
quite young children (Matthews, 1980, 1984, 1994) have prima facie applications to youth whose special 
psychiatric needs prompt clinical referral. The question must still be put: ‘What is necessary to transform 
moral education into moral psycho-education for those with moral developmental delays or 
psychopathological interferences?'  Aichorn's seminal work with 'wayward youth' (Aichorn, 1935), 
Kohlberg's 'just community' (Gibbs et al. 1996), Garbarino's recommended programme for 'lost boys' 
(Garbarino, 1998) are some benchmarks for projects involving youth with what, in current clinical 
parlance, have come to be termed externalizing disorders.  As a very recent example, current practice 
parameters for the assessment and treatment of sexually reactive adolescents refers to attaining treatment 
goals relevant to victim awareness and empathy, values clarification and impulse inhibition (American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Practice Parameters, 1999).  However, comprehensive 
mental health centers, psychiatric services in community hospitals, and outpatient clinics do not only treat 
youth with externalizing disorders.  These service lines may chiefly offer broad spectrum group therapeutic 
modalities including cognitive behavioral interventions, stress management, skill building, aggression 
replacement training, anger management, as well as psycho-educational interventions for a variety of 
disorders afflicting youth: externalizing, internalizing and combinations. 
This is the first in a series of articles to characterize and critically consider recently employed 
forms of conscience sensitive psychiatric treatment of children and adolescents.  The series, as envisioned, 
will continue by including further commentary on the subject of this article from co-therapists and 
applications of conscience sensitive psychiatry to individual treatment in the acute psychiatric hospital 
setting. 
 
Method. 
 
Therapeutic loci were selected within a well-established, community-based continuum of care.1 Daylong 
workshops 2were conducted by the authors for interested mental health clinicians to acquaint them with the 
Indiana University Conscience Project, with the following goals: 
                                                          
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the in-kind support provided by St Vincent's Stress Centers 
Indianapolis, Indiana:  Paul Lefkovitz, PhD., Clinical Director and Jerry Fletcher, M.D. Medical Director 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Bev Berger, RN, Coordinator for Youth Day School, Partial 
Hospitalization and Intensive Outpatient Programs, Mimi Brittingham, MSN, CS, LMF, Site Coordinator 
for Meridian Youth Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Outpatient Services, Marjorie Cline LCSW, and Julie 
Martin MS, LMHC; Children's Bureau Incorporated Retreat :  Jon Bennett, Senior Vice President, Janet 
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1) To provide them with direct personal experience of a secular, psycho-biologically based 
examination of conscience using an adapted version of the SCI developed for coursework in 
Conscience Centered Professional Ethics (Galvin, Gaffney, Stilwell and Abram, 1997)  
2) To review with them research findings summarized in the above Introduction  
3) To discuss previously employed clinical applications of the SCI to assessment and treatment 
planning and,  
4) To lay the groundwork for conscience sensitive group therapy.  
 
Preliminary discussions of applications of Conscience Theory to treatment had been the object of a special 
interest group, the Conscience Study Group at Pleasant Run Incorporated, which convened regularly at a 
community based residential treatment center.  3 Several ideas for therapeutic tasks embedded in the 
modules emerged from these discussions.  The modules were designed based upon domains of conscience 
functioning.  The pertinent question set from the SCI is identified for each module in the Discussion 
section below.  Applications were made to recognized benchmarks for interventions in the treatment of 
psychopathology.  Each module was designed to be sufficiently complete such that full participation from 
persons entering the cycle of modules at any point would not be compromised.  One of the authors paired 
with interested, experienced therapists in existing programs to conduct and refine interventions in group 
psycho-educational therapy format.  
 
 
 
 
Results. 
 
Over one hundred and fifty hours of conscience sensitive psycho-educational group therapy were 
conducted in therapeutic loci within a well-established, community-based continuum of care.  The 
therapeutic loci ranged from a child and adolescent psychiatry outpatient clinic (cumulative N= 13, age-
range 12-14 years old) to a closed youth residential setting (cumulative N=28, age range 9-17 years old) 
and included a semester based youth day school (cumulative N= 14, age range 7-16 years old), adolescent 
psychiatric intensive outpatient (cumulative N= 40, age range 12-18 years old) and partial hospitalization 
(cumulative N=31, age range 13-18 years old) programs.  Number of participants in any module varied 
from a single participant in attendance in the outpatient locus to fifteen participants in the intensive 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Meeker, Program Manager, Julia Bradshaw, Therapist;  and the Indiana University School of Medicine 
Conscience Project, Meg Gaffney, M.D., Director.    
 
2 Workshop at St. Vincent's Stress Center (Day School and IOP), 5/21/01, 
  conducted with Meg Gaffney and Barb Stilwell.  
  Guests Rita Kohn and Neal Wilkey. 
  Workshop at Children's Bureau Incorporated 1/30/02: 
  with Meg Gaffney, Barbara Stilwell 
  and Guest: Sandy Laramore Ferraro.  
 
3 As Clinical Director of Pleasant Run, Kim Haga, PhD, directed that Dr. Tom Battocletti's Work/Study 
Group be reorganized to consider how conscience could be incorporated in treatment.  Participants in these 
various groups included I.U. Conscience Project members and several PRI clinical, administrative and 
support staff united in their interest in conscience, in alphabetical order: Tom Battocletti, Sue Brown, Janet 
Carlson, Kanesha Crawford, Meg Gaffney, Matt Galvin, Gayle Harrell, Cynthia Holloway, Erron Kelly, 
Rae Lynn Kelly, Rita Kohn, Kinzua LeSuer, April McWilliams, Brenda Melton, Mary Jean Pies, Maroline 
Ritter, Deborah Stamper, Monte Stevenson, Barb Stilwell, Sue Walker and Neal Wilkey. The nursing 
contingent among these participants, Ms. Stamper, CNS, Ms. Kelly, RN and Ms. Harrell, RN, and Dr. 
Wilkey, a fourth year psychiatry resident at I.U. began with Dr. Galvin the task of developing a format for 
conscience sensitive psychoeducational group therapy.  The first group was brought to premature closure 
when, after 134 years, Pleasant Run was obliged to close its doors. 
 
 4
outpatient locus.  Formal intellectual testing was not uniformly available for participants.  Most however 
appeared to be average intellectually, some appeared to have above average or borderline intellectual 
functioning and only a few were classified as mildly mentally handicapped by testing from their schools.  
Each participant had, at minimum, an initial assessment by a mental health clinician yielding multiaxial 
psychiatric diagnoses per The Diagnostic Statistical Manual IV (APA, 1994).  The community-based 
continuum of care has a specialized program for primary diagnosis of adolescent substance abuse, which 
was not included in the study.    No restrictions were placed upon participants in terms of their principal or 
secondary diagnoses or severity of impairment although all had sufficient severity of impairment to be 
deemed in need of the aforementioned psychiatric or psychosocial interventions.  Length of time for each 
of the seven modules was permitted to vary according to the stability of the population in the therapeutic 
setting.  Individual modules conducted in the adolescent psychiatric intensive outpatient program were 
limited to one hour each, whereas some modules conducted in the residential and youth day school settings 
extended over several sessions held once weekly.  Seven modules were eventually developed and refined to 
comprise a full course of conscience sensitive psycho-educational group therapy. 
 
 
Discussion.  
 
For purposes of this discussion, each module will be described separately in terms of the SCI questions and 
therapeutic tasks employed.  Meta- (moral)-psychological (or moral philosophical) considerations that have 
arisen are presented in the context of each module as it is characterized in praxis. 
 
Psycho-educational Group 
Therapy (CST-Group TX)
• seven interchangeable modules
• closed groups may lengthen the number of 
sessions for each module
• in open groups, modules are each one hour
• participant observation from youth care 
workers
    
     A Youth Care Worker's Conscience 
CST-Group TX (cont’): 
• process issues are made part of the 
examination of conscience 
• modules are designed according to domain
– each module has a unique question set to be 
covered in discussion
– each module has a specific therapeutic task to 
be completed
– each module has an intrinsic value to be 
identified 
 
This image of conscience was rendered by a youth care worker.  
She explained the elements in writing: 
 
"1) Cross because Christ is the center of any decision (Christian  
      upbringing). 
  2) Parents' disapproval (or teachers, bosses, etc). 
  3) A clear conscience lets me sleep well 
 4) A clear conscience lets/helps me see the beauty in nature and   
      others. 
  5) If I intentionally make a wrong choice, nothing good will    
      come of it and could invoke the wrath of God, others, or     
      anger towards myself. 
  
CST-Group TX 
Foundation Work                   
• personal matters: thoughts, feelings, values, 
choices, behaviors
• circle of confidentiality (respect for 
autonomy)
• participation (contributory value)
• regulation of self disclosure (respect for 
privacy)
• respect for other’s disclosures
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First Module: An Exercise in Moral Imagination 
SCI Questions 1, 2, 11.4
 
         What considerations stand in favor of:  
1) posing the questions   
“Have you heard the word conscience?”  
“ What does it mean?”  
  2) penetrating to the heart of the matter by asking,  
“What does the word mean to you, personally?”  
  3) giving the instruction, 
 “Describe your own conscience,”  
4) then making an assignment to: 
“Use your imagination and draw a picture of    
 your conscience.” 
Why couple these interventions with the two-fold assurance that 
there is no expectation of correct or incorrect answers and that there will be no preferred definition revealed 
and promulgated after discussion?  Why imply that the personal definition is superior to a conventional 
definition?  Is this done in an effort to adhere to some form of moral relativism?  
CST-Group TX: 1st Module 
The Question Set
• general and personal definitions of 
conscience 
– written down before any discussion
– alternative interrogatories and directions 
according to cognitive level
– assurances that responses will not be 
treated as incorrect 
The Möbius strip is sometimes offered as a representation of how the mind-body ‘problem’ (in its 
most contemporaneous form, the phenomenon of consciousness) may be resolved (or dissolved).  When 
traced, the apparent inside of this loop is found to be continuous with the apparent outside.  The Möbius 
strip is offered as mute testimony to false dichotomy.  On this view there is no inside or outside--simply 
one ‘side’, not otherwise specified.  Analogously, it is argued, mental state (interior, inner state, subjective) 
descriptions and brain-state (exterior, objective) descriptions falsely dichotomize a monistic reality, not 
otherwise specified (Hofstadter, 1979; Trimble, 2002; Schiller, 1982).  This argument from analogy, while 
appealing to the imagination, falters.  For one thing, a genuine alternative to taking either an inside-out 
approach or an outside-in approach eludes description.  Allowing ‘in’ to vanish altogether is the chimerical 
goal of the eliminative materialist program.  For most, this is a disagreeable process that, consistently 
applied without boundaries, would eliminate goal directed investigation into brain states and eventually the 
eliminative materialist program, itself, insofar as programs are executed according to goals and objectives 
(i.e. outcomes of valuational processing).  For another thing, the Möbius strip yields the secret of its nature 
only after its loop appears to have been fully traversed.  The loop that is variously and inadequately 
described by brain states and mental states, including consciousness, does not seem susceptible of such a 
roundtrip.  There is not anything like an epiphany, an ‘Ah-hah!’  experience: “I had thought I was on the 
inside looking out but now methinks I am on the outside looking in.” 
Whatever else is said of it, conscience is a form of consciousness.  It is moralized consciousness.  
As a form of consciousness it is bound to draw subjective experience into the definition.  Without the 
subjective experience represented any attempted definition of conscience is suspect.  Who is more expert 
about the unique contours of conscience than the person to whom it belongs?  True, the outward signs of 
conscience like the outward signs of other forms of consciousness can be described objectively by others.  
By virtue of experiences with others, which, by the way, already require subjective correlation, and perhaps 
also by virtue of empathic responsiveness, which requires inter-subjective resonance, one person is able to 
draw inferences about the conscience of another person.  However, the inferential enterprise in which the 
subjective account is rejected or reduced produces scant information in comparison to the inquiry that aims 
to engage the moral personhood of another.  The inferential enterprise that does not take into account the 
other’s moral personhood is impoverished in more ways than just the low yield of clinically relevant data.  
An opportunity for healing or flourishing is missed.  If a conventional definition is externally imposed, the 
subsequent description of inner states of conscience can still be elicited but will lack meaning for the 
person of conscience.  On the other hand, each invitation to conceptualize conscience generates a new and 
viable definition allowing the person to compose the good life in narrative form, to make of the diverse 
domains of personhood a moral whole.  When a person is asked to describe the inner states of conscience, 
to compare and contrast these with received knowledge about the word, that person has an invitation to 
                                                          
4 The SCI is available at this URL, shaw.medlib.iupui.edu/conscience 
See:  Stilwell, B. (2003): Trauma, moral development, and conscience functioning.  Conscience Works: 
Theory, Research and Clinical Applications 2 (1): Appendix A. 
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exercise moral imagination, to render an account of mindfulness that includes, literally, the moral of the 
person’s life-story thus-far. 
 Far from beginning with an unconstrained moral 
relativism or value neutrality in the service of value clarification, 
the facilitators’ first questions uphold values intrinsic to 
conscience: respect for autonomy and respect for meaning 
making.  Even so, it is not until conscience drawings are 
requested that the persons of conscience are certain that what is 
being truly encouraged are their individualized 
conceptualizations.  Once they are asked to draw, they are closer 
to allowing themselves free rein to treat conscience 
metaphorically.  They are encouraged to bring moral imagination 
to bear on the composition of moral being.  Discussions of 
concepts are enlivened.  
CST-Group TX: 1st Module 
The Conscience Drawing
• The Image of Moralized Consciousness
– requested prior to any discussion of the written 
definitions 
– associations encouraged
 
The Composite Conscience.  
 
Each group has been different.  Nonetheless, most 
participants have listened to one another sufficiently well 
that they readily produce a composite conscience 
identifying at least some of the domains recognized from 
our empirical research with advantaged children.  They use 
cognitive and/or emotional and/or valuational, and/or 
volitional and/or relational descriptors.  Key words are 
identified from the discussion, and made visual on the 
board.  The key words are then organized according to the 
known domains and a first approximation of the group’s 
composite conscience is made.  In the event that a 
particular group does not represent a domain, the relevance 
of the missing domain for other groups can be the subject 
of supplemental remarks by the facilitators.  
After preliminary discussion, when age-appropriate to use, 
the 15-minute video Conceptualization of Conscience 
(Stilwell et al., 1990) can be shown.  It is best to put the 
video in pause mode after each set of drawings to elicit 
discussion from the group before listening to the recorded 
analysis.  Often, group participants make many pertinent 
observations approximating to the theory of stages of 
conscience development.  This realization can be revisited 
in subsequent conversations about delays in conscience 
formation and psychopathological interference in 
conscience functioning.  
 The goal is to introduce the notion of stage 
development without pursuing it to the point that 
participants engage in staging (and/or ‘upstaging’) one 
another.  Rather, once the group composite conscience is 
characterized, the notion of contours of conscience can be 
raised with the aim of fostering tolerance (and eventual 
celebration) for diversity in moral lives. 
Clockwise from the top left: conscience images  
with salient contours  in moral emotional, moral 
valuational, moral attachment and conceptual 
domains.  Center drawing: moral valuation and 
volition.
 
 
 
 
Sometimes it is helpful to explicate and illustrate how the inner states participants describe are 
intimately connected but not reducible one to another.  Called for are brief, consistent and gently applied 
 7
correctives to our folk psychology which limits itself only to the more familiar terms thoughts and feelings 
mirroring a dualistic academic psychology which often names only cognitions and affects, respectively.  
Efforts to smuggle in moral psychology in the guise of  ‘social–cognitions’ and ‘social–emotions’ because 
of embarrassment over moral language, notwithstanding, there exists a gap that can only be closed by 
explicit use of terms like ‘conscience’ in moral psychobiology.  An illustration of this gap follows: 
One university professor approached after the authors had conducted a workshop on conscience 
centered professional ethics.  She had enjoyed our workshop, she said, but related ruefully that in 
her academic department, “We avoid the idea of conscience like the plague.”  Her department, we 
learned, was ethics.  
Moral philosophy is not the only discipline in which some regard the word conscience with disfavor.  Not 
so long ago, the emergence in therapeutic conversations, including supervisory experiences, of modal 
modifiers characteristic of moral language, e.g. ‘shoulds’ and ‘shouldn’ts’, were regarded by 
psychotherapists as signs of at least faulty cognition if not compulsive psychopathology.  We, who 
matriculated in professional schools in that era, may have more or less successfully expunged from our 
clinical dialects any use of shoulds or shouldn’ts so that we would not be accused of inconsistency when 
we directed our patients to eschew the same words.  We may even have found means to convey our healing 
values through circumlocution or non-verbal legerdemain.  After so many years of this, we may now find 
ourselves in the position of being more embarrassed by moral language than by explicit sexual language.  A 
worthy aim is to desensitize persons, including ourselves as therapists, to a freer use of moral language.  It 
can be pointed out that we commonly evaluate our own and others’ thoughts and feelings or that they come 
framed with a valence.  Re-framing is above all else a valuational enterprise. 
 Adding valuational to cognitive and affective description enriches the psychological 
characterization of complex inner states.  Despite this enrichment, the proposed psychological explanation 
has not yet acquired the rudiments that make it adequate.  In some psychological explanations, choosing--
volition--itself is left as embarrassingly unaccountable.  Volition, like valuation, is irreducible and has its 
place in an adequate psychology of inner states.  
At this juncture, it is not uncommon to have the first opportunity to characterize defenses 
operating against conscience activity even at the level of language.  It may be remarked, for example, how 
we prefer to say, “ I made a mistake,” instead of  “ I did something wrong,” or how we like to disguise and 
dismiss our moral approval of right and good actions with the aesthetic remark, “ That’s cool.”  Participants 
have generally appreciated when we as counselors acknowledge our tendency to conceal our moral values 
in language about this or that lifestyle choice being healthy or unhealthy, that or this behavior being 
adaptive or maladaptive.  The question may be raised, “ What about the tenet of our professions to be non-
judgmental?”  The response may be given that striving to be non-judgmental is not the same as striving to 
be value-neutral.  Simply stated, “I expect to find something-many things in fact- to approve about you as a 
person of conscience.”  Simply stated, “I will make no effort to conceal that I uphold a set of values known 
as healing values that I believe are built upon the bedrock values of conscience itself.”   
  
                                 
CST-Group TX: 1st Module              
Intrinsic Value: Meaning
• strengthening the domain
– exercising moral imagination for achieving 
moral health (e.g. Shelton)
– opportunities to identify moral issues (Right 
vs.Wrong)
– opportunities to identify moral dilemmas (Right 
vs. Right)
 
CST-Group TX: 1st Module
Extraction of the Intrinsic Value
• Conceptualization of Conscience/ Moral 
Imagination  as a moral psychological 
domain
• Moral Meaning Making as the intrinsic or 
bedrock value associated with the domain
• The Allure of Value 
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Second Module: Moral Connections 
SCI Questions: 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 13. 
 
The Moralized Time-Line 
 
CST-Group TX: 2nd Module 
The Question Set
• early moral memories
• who has cared the most 
about your conscience?
• moral mandate 
attributions 
CST-Group TX: 2nd Module 
The Moralized Time-Line
• retrieving memories of disapproval
– (depression makes it easy)
• retrieving memories of approval 
– (depression makes it hard)
• changes in how appraisals are appraised 
– (overvalued devaluations)
• attaching importance to an attachment figure 
– (changes in the lifespan)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The questions posed include the Moral Attachment Questions from the SCI.  The first delve into 
early memories of approval and disapproval and an invitation to evaluate each in terms of the effect upon 
the person, the moral lesson imparted.  In the individual mental status examination, three out of three items 
may be readily retrieved by a person in testing of immediate recall, and relatively value neutral events, such 
as what was had for breakfast, from recent memory.  However, a person of conscience subject to 
depression, to dissociation or to low self-esteem concomitant with other conditions such as the experience 
of childhood neglect, is apt to have impoverished early, remote and recent memory for experiences of 
approval.  Be prepared.  The assignment to retrieve moral memories may prompt recollection of 
maltreatment experiences or harsh, punitive treatment.  A person with disruptive behavior disorder is apt to 
have less difficulty retrieving recent experiences of disapproval, but may still have difficulties retrieving 
early memories of appraisal of any sort or may dismiss the question by conveying the information, “ I’ve 
never had the experience of approval only disapproval.”  These are all opportunities for psycho-educational 
interventions regarding psychopathological interference.  In particular, the notion of depression as a 
valuational as well as a mood disorder may be introduced, in passing, with agreement to defer in-depth 
discussion until the appropriate module.  Therapeutic opportunity also emerges when pushing back the 
Moralized Time Line beyond more recent memories of approval to more distant ones, diverting the 
participants from depressive cognitive pathways.  Of course embedded in the moral memory is the 
experience of moralized attachment.   
  
    The Triple-Pass Genogram 
 
Figure 1: 
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Moralized attachment is approached more 
explicitly in the assigned task of constructing a triple pass 
genogram.  The conventional symbology of genograms is 
first taught to older participants.  The first pass elucidates 
biological connection and disconnection using standard 
genograms and offers another opportunity to describe how 
biological conditions may be a threat to conscience 
formation and functioning.  Biological conditions may be 
heritable or may consist of environmental modulation of 
genetic expression as, for example, in the transduction of 
stress responses to adversity into depression.   
The second pass elucidates emotional connection 
(affiliative and conflictual aspects each represented) and disconnection (including loss).  Emotional 
attachments are depicted by rays emanating from the proband symbol.  Participants often develop their own 
notations and this practice may be encouraged.  However in cases where individualized symbology is not 
forthcoming or where uniformity is preferred for the sake of communication, the double bond and the 
lightning flash zigzag are serviceable to represent close and conflictual relations, respectively.  These lend 
themselves metaphorically to making the homework assignment, at the conclusion of the module, to 
strengthen a connection or to smooth out some of the rough edges in a selected attachment relationship.  
CST-Group TX: 2nd Module 
The Triple Pass Genogram
• teaching the symbolic notation
• first pass: biological connections
• second pass: emotional connections
• third pass: moral connections
• reconstruction of the genogram for the group
• intergenerational transmission of values
The third pass elucidates moral connections.  Moral connections may be conceptualized according 
to the SCI questions “ Who cares most about your goodness?  About your badness?”  For younger children, 
the use of successive family kinetic drawings can be used:  
 
“First draw a picture of everyone in the family doing something”;   
“Next, draw a picture of what happens in your family when you’ve done something good”; and  
“Now draw a picture of the family when you’ve done something bad.”  
 
The intergenerational transmission of values can also be subject to drawing: assign participants to   
“ Draw a picture of how a person in your family shows s/he cares about your goodness” and, mutatis 
mutandis, assign the mirror task with respect to badness.  Each participant is invited to reconstruct the 
genogram for the group.  The observing participants may be engaged in interpretation and summarization 
of what they learn about each other’s family trees and the intergenerational transmission of values.  Often 
the focus can be shifted to the proband as an actual or potential moral connection for others in the family.  
The intrinsic value of connectedness can usually be elicited in discussion of the question, “ What value is a 
person upholding as s/he strengthens this domain of his/her conscience?”  Or, “What do we think is 
important when we try to strengthen this part of conscience?”   
 
CST-Group TX: 2nd Module
Extraction of the Intrinsic Value
• Moralized Attachment  
– a moral psychological domain
• Connectedness
– the intrinsic or bedrock value associated with 
the domain
CST-Group TX: 2nd Module             
Intrinsic Value: Connectedness
• strengthening the domain
– strengthening an existing connection
• when the spatio-temporal connection is intact
• when the spatio-temporal connection is lost
– reckoning one’s moral worth to another person 
of conscience 
– establishing a new moral connection
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Third and Fourth Modules: Moral Emotions. 
SCI Questions: 3, 4, & 5. 
 
   Ethical perspectives on the promontories of life’s 
beginning (reproductive values) and life’s end (end-of –life 
values) put these boundary conditions in bold relief.  The moral 
peaks and valleys are readily recognized, albeit exceedingly 
daunting to traverse even (especially?) in one another’s 
company.  Moralized emotionality is apt to run high on all sides 
of the salient issues.  The danger emerges at every turn that those 
whose beliefs differ will be treated as less than persons of 
conscience.  Those who differ may even, in extreme cases of 
intolerance, forfeit inclusion in their antagonist’s ambit of 
conscience.  Many of us, for this reason, learn to shun moral 
precipices, actively avoid the conditions we fear will eventuate in crises of conscience.  Similarly, persons 
of conscience often succeed in ignoring the call to moral adventure and right-doing.  In the event, it may 
take the efforts of others (more conscientious in some specifiable regard) ranging anywhere from mild 
suasion to fire-and-brimstone exhortation to raise our consciousness that the issues are indeed inescapably 
moral ones.  
CST-Group TX: 3rd Module          
Discrete and Moralized Emotions
On the other hand, negotiating the terrain of day-to-day life does not seem to require frequent 
consultation of moral map and compass.  Doubtless, the opportunities for right and wrongdoing are ever in 
abundance.  However, the internal compass of conscience reliably works at preconscious (procedural/tacit/ 
implicit) levels, at the level of virtuous (or, at the least, counter-vicious) habituation, such that wide 
deviations from permissible pathways trigger its anticipatory guidance.  When deliberate excursions from 
permissible pathways are made for the sake of misadventure, moral awareness is triggered, moral emotion 
is aroused, albeit with the very real possibility of temporary denial of the one and suppression of the other.  
However, for some, conscience has a way of nagging and spoiling a person’s resort to creature comforts.  It 
may be appreciated through literature that, for some, conscience scorned becomes palpable, externalized in 
some concrete form, for example as a revenant, a haunting apparition or an illusory sensory experience.  
Many adolescent participants will be familiar with Edgar Allen Poe’s story The Tell-Tale Heart (Poe, 
1989) or Lady MacBeth’s monologue about the damn spot (Shakespeare, 1971). Usually much less 
dramatic, the nagging conscience is a conscience in cognitive mode.  It may be unaccompanied by any 
somatic experiences of which to speak.  This could be alexithymia.  It could also be a normal variation in 
the human condition.  On the other hand, absent concern about wrongdoing being discovered by others, 
absent anything at all except the perception or the possibility of wrongdoing, some participants are apt to 
endure robust gut reactions or other psychophysiological changes.  For still others, conscience is 
recognized as residing at the heart in part because of its way of inflicting emotional hurt and altering mood.  
 
The Ring of Glaucon Questions 
 
 
Imagine now that two such rings existed and the just man put on 
one, the unjust the other….  To begin with the unjust man.  [With 
his ring on,] he must operate like a skilled professional- for 
example, a top-class pilot or doctor, [who] must be perfect in his 
wickedness; he must be able to commit the greatest crimes 
perfectly and at the same time get himself a reputation for the 
highest probity, while if he makes a mistake he must be able to 
retrieve it, and if any of his wrongdoing comes to light, be ready 
with a convincing defense….  Beside our picture of the unjust man let us set one of the just man…  
‘Who wants to be and not seem good.’  [With his ring on, the just man] is not allow[ed] to seem 
good…. No,  [he is stripped] of everything except his justice…[is given] an undeserved and 
lifelong reputation for wickedness, and [made to stick to] his chosen course until death….  
 
(Rendered from passages 359a-361d in the Prelude to Plato’s Republic:  the story of Glaucon’s 
rings) 
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 Rings of Glaucon
• Moral Emotions I
• Internal Anxiety 
– ‘What happens inside when you’ve done something bad?’
• First Ring of Glaucon: ‘if no one knows?’
– ‘What happens inside when you’ve done something good?’
• Second Ring of Glaucon: ‘if no one knows?’
   
CST-Group TX: 3rd Module 
The Question Set (cont’)
• Moral Emotions I: 
• External Anxiety
– ‘What happens (on the) outside when you’ve done 
something good?’
• Second Ring of Glaucon: ‘if no one knows?’
– ‘What happens (on the) outside when you’ve done 
something bad?’
• First ring of Glaucon: ‘if no one knows?’
 
The Ring of Glaucon questions, posed at this juncture, are devised to elicit discussion of anxiety, 
mood alteration and somatic correlates of conscience functions.  Revisited in the context of valuation, the 
Ring of Glaucon questions illuminate internalization.  The psycho-educational opportunity is usually 
present for discussion of temperament, diversity in the experience of discrete moral emotions and the 
variety of conscience contours.   
 
With respect to temperament and conscience, a basic knowledge of Grazynska Kochanska and her 
colleagues’ work is essential.  In early work, Kochanska 
identifies two developmental processes important in conscience 
formation: the development of the tendency to experience 
affective discomfort, guilt, and anxiety associated with wrong-
doing and the development of behavioral control, the ability to 
inhibit a prohibited action.  
With respect to discrete emotions, Izard’s work is a 
good starting place.  
The essential points to make are that each discrete emotion has 
a characteristic facial expression, a neurobiology, and a 
correlative subjective experience.  ‘How Are You Feeling 
today?’ charts, more or less derivative from Izard’s seminal 
investigations, have become ubiquitous in clinical settings and classrooms.  They have even found their 
way onto refrigerator doors in magnetized miniatures.  Nota bene, many charts perpetuate confounds 
between conditions (e.g. depression, cognitive states), attitudes (valuational states) and emotions.  In the 
exercise, adolescents as well as children are provided copies of the faces evincing various emotions.  They 
are asked to use one color to code the emotions that are experienced when they have done something good 
and someone knows it.  They select a second color to code emotions associated with undisclosed, 
undetected  (perhaps perceived as unappreciated) good deeds.  Another color is selected to code emotions 
that are experienced when they have done something wrong and someone knows it.  A fourth color is used 
to code moral emotional responses to undisclosed and undiscovered wrongdoing.  Alternatively participants 
may be asked to identify what they consider moral emotional responses typical of others versus their own 
actual responses.  
CST-Group TX: 3rd Module          
Discrete and Moralized Emotions 
(cont’)                            
• pictured emotions identified in association with 
right-doing by oneself, by others
• pictured emotions identified in association with 
wrong-doing by oneself, by others
 
Empathy is bound to come up both in terms of ‘too-much’ 
and ‘too-little.’  Hoffman’s developmental approach may be 
helpful to have in mind.  The relationship of empathy to guilt 
is an important didactic point to make that sets the stage for a 
re-valuation of moral emotions (references for Kochanska, 
Izard, and Hoffman are included in the bibliography).  
The re-valuation of moral emotions begins with the 
question of what one person of conscience might wish for 
another in terms of emotional well being.  Participants are 
asked to identify moral exemplars who have pursued 
goodness at the expense of health and happiness as well as 
persons who might be seen as healthy but who have repudiated the good life.  The complex relations 
obtaining among the concepts of happiness, health and goodness come to light.  The intrinsic value of 
Empathy: 
• resonating with the biology of 
emotion and listening to its 
biography
– guilt as an empathic response
– initial exercise in empathy
• ‘How do you tell when someone is 
hurt?’
• ‘What happens inside you when you 
recognize harm done?’
– psychopathological interference 
with moral emotions
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harmony or equanimity and the motivational allure of goodness apart from so-called positive emotions are 
likewise topics for discussion.  
CST-Group TX: 3rd & 4th Modules       
Intrinsic Value: Balance
• re-evaluation of moral emotions
Q: What is the nature of emotional well-being? 
A:  Full range of  human emotion   
Congruence of  human  emotions
Adaptive regulation of human emotion
    
The Worth of So-called Negative 
Emotions
• good even if they  don’t feel so good
• guilt tolerance (it is a form  of empathy after all)
• under- and  overvaluation of moral emotionality
– “ he keeps smiling when I punish him”
– “ she doesn’t have remorse” 
• guilt induction vs. guilt as punishment
• regulation of empathic arousal
• suspension of moral reactivity
 
 
 
 
 
 
     The Letter of Apology 
 
CST-Group TX: 4th Module 
The Question Set
• Moral Emotions II:
– reparation and healing
• reparative mechanisms 
– forgiveness
– gratitude
• healing measures
• defense mechanisms
                 
CST-Group TX: 4th Module 
The Letter of Apology
• may be an exercise in moral imagination
• identification of critical elements
– identification of harm done 
– ownership of harm 
– expression of regret
– amendatory proposal
• identification of extraneous and vitiating 
elements
 
 
This is another exercise in moral imagination.  It is helpful to make the imaginary aspect of this 
exercise explicit.  Discussion revolves around essential features of the letter, recognition of harm done, 
owning the harm done, an expression of sorrow, and an offer to make amends.  Extraneous, particularly 
exculpatory inclusions are often identified by other participants.  The discussion that ensues often revolves 
around forgiveness.  The relationship between forgiveness and gratitude brings the group back to the 
awareness that any discussion of moral emotional responsiveness is not confined to amendatory, reparative 
and healing strategies but also includes taking stock of ways of replenishing and ways of flourishing. 
 
 
CST-Group TX: 3rd & 4th
Modules 
Extraction of The Intrinsic Value
• Moral Emotional Responsiveness 
– a moral psychological domain
• Equanimity/Harmony/Balance
– the intrinsic or bedrock value associated with 
the domain.
   
CST-Group TX: 3rd & 4th Modules 
Intrinsic Value: Balance (cont’) 
• strengthening the domain
– developing a repertory of reparative strategies
• seeking forgiveness and being forgiving
• restitution
• gratitude
– healing strategies
• solitude
• time for reflection
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The Fifth Module: Moral Valuation 
SCI Questions: 8, 12, 13, and 14. 
 
 
CST-Group TX: 5th Module
The Question Set
• do’s and don'ts 
• attributions in value 
keeping
• derivations in value 
making
• intergenerational 
transmission of family 
values revisited
     
Rings of Glaucon revisited:
• do’s and don'ts absent approval/disapproval
 
 
Moral mandates in the form of do’s and don’ts, should’s and shouldn’t’s, ought’s and ought not’s 
are culled from the moral consciousness of the group.  Sometimes a moral mandate will be expressed in 
terms that are so valuationally thick they admit of little discussion and even less disagreement.  Such a 
moral mandate may be a candidate for universality among Right vs. Wrong statements or may express 
something akin to a tautology.  In one group, “Don’t be cruel to animals” was generally accepted without 
much comment.  When the valuationally thick term ‘cruel’ was underscored and the (still uncomfortable 
but less valuationally thick) term ‘harmful’ substituted, a lively discussion drawing in most participants 
ensued.  
 
The Valuation Matrix 
CST-Group TX: 5th Module          
The Valuational Matrix
• eliciting best moral reasons 
– to abide by the moral mandate
– to ignore the moral mandate
• baser motives
– to abide by the moral mandate 
– to ignore the moral mandate
  
 
   The Valuation Matrix    
 
How are the values that undergird the moral mandates made explicit?  One way is to specify the 
mandate and then construct a two by two grid: best reasons and base motives, divided in a column and 
abide by the rule and excuse/ignore the rule occupying a row.  We have called this the Valuational Matrix.  
Older youth often demonstrate recognition of the term ‘matrix’ owing to their exposure to the film 
featuring Keanu Reeves.  A few are able to define the term.  Responses recorded in both the best reasons 
cells are reframed as values.  Work promoting moral reasoning can be conducted by blocking one reason in 
favor of eliciting a more altruistic, albeit weaker, one.  For example, if the best reason provided by one 
participant is to avoid trouble with the law, her moral imagination might be engaged by posing the first 
Ring of Glaucon question slanted now towards valuation rather than moral emotion, “What if you were 
very sure you would not be caught doing x, what would your best reason be then?”  Not only are values 
identified but also, in this manner, the concept of moral dilemma (genuine Right vs Right considerations) 
may first emerge and gain recognition from the group.  If the concept of moral dilemma does emerge, then 
the litmus tests for Right vs Right issues (à la Kidder) are germane to further discussion.  Groups may 
struggle with contra-distinguishing moral reasoning from sophistical rationalization.  They may also 
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identify defense mechanisms other than rationalization operating to prevent the full recognition of a moral 
issue.  Consideration of baser motives may issue into discussion of psychopathological conditions that 
interfere with the ability of persons of conscience to retrieve best reasons (or summon up will power to act 
upon them, which will be the subject of the next module on Moral Volition).  The Valuation Matrix allows 
for appreciation that there exists a value-motive gap.  Clearly, sometimes the strongest motive for abiding 
by a rule is not after all the best reason.  However, put another way, encouraging best reasons to acquire 
strength at the expense of baser motives is one definition of moral growth.  
  
The Valuational Triangle 
 
CST-Group TX: 5th Module          
The Valuation Triangle
• authority derived/attributed
• peer derived/attributed
– manipulations from media and the mall
• self derived/attributed
       Figure 3:  The Valuational Triangle 
 
Some moral mandates in the composite group conscience will have already emerged in the module 
on Moralized Attachment as rules for life based upon the intergenerational transmission of values.  This is 
an important modality for value-keeping.  Other mandates derive from value-seeking among peers.  Still 
others may be values-in-the-making contra-distinguished in origination from either authorities or peers.  
These latter may have most to do with self-development in a self-centered sense (e.g. egoism, enlightened 
self-interest) or in a non-selfish sense (e.g. eudaemonism).  {Indeed an interesting digression may be set in 
motion by the question: ‘Are the intrinsic (bedrock) values of conscience attributable to self in a 
eudaemonistic sense?’}  However, the matter becomes quite complex when considering who or what each 
moral mandate regards- its pertinence, to whom it is attributed, its degree of internalization irrespective of 
its origins, and its actual psychodynamic derivations irrespective of attribution.  The moral philosophical 
distinctions among intrinsic, instrumental, contributory and originative values are applicable with greater 
intricacy, greater subtlety than may have been appreciated formerly (Nozick, 1981).  While attributed in 
origin to the self, some moral mandates may nonetheless be authority or peer regarding.  Often rules about 
peers are derived from peer relationships, but there may be scaffolding provided by external authority 
figures.  So it makes sense to discuss such rules as peer regarding as well as authority derived.  A rule may 
also have become so internalized that the scaffolding provided by external authority figures has been 
disassembled in all but moral memory.  The person (facilitator or other participant) mindful of such 
complexities in moral psychology is apt to strike a deeper aporia.       
For the sake of many other participants, the facilitator should be prepared to clarify just what 
information (with respect to derivation, origination, pertinence, degree of internalization or attribution) is 
being requested when the list of mandates is reviewed and labeled by group participants with A for 
‘Authority’, P for ‘Peer’ and S for ‘Self’.  Having made this point, it remains to be said that, from the 
developmental perspective at least, the visual aid of the Value Triangle is probably most useful to depict 
internalization.  In this heuristic device, the person of conscience is represented in the center of the triangle.  
Vectors represent the direction of internalization, externally supported acquiescence or perhaps, oppositely 
directed, repudiation.  The scalene triangle with its obtuse angle occupied by Authority-regarding mandates 
is gradually transformed into one in which Peer- regarding mandates demand a more generous allotment of 
degree.  With further maturation, the triangle becomes equilateral with evenly distributed moral mandates 
speaking to elder-worth, other-worth and self-worth, virtually all being owned by the subject with varying 
requirements for external conscience supports.  Participants are encouraged to construct personal 
valuational triangles based upon their personal sets of moral mandates. 
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Figure 4: 
 
 
  
                   
CST-Group TX: 5th Module          
Intrinsic Value: Worthiness
• the allure of value is motivational 
– but akrasia is also a possibility
• closing the motive-reason gap in behalf of moral 
growth
• elevating moral dialogue and ethical discourse
– crediting others with best reasons
– suspending moral reactivity to the baser motives of 
others
 
Developmental 
Changes in the 
Valuation 
Triangle 
 
 
 
The Sixth Module: Moral Volition  
SCI Question: 15. 
 
CST-Group TX: 6th Module
Moral Volition
• autonomy
• agency
• advocacy
   
CST-Group TX: 6th Module          
The Question Set
• awareness of  growth and change
• enlarging the ambit of conscience
 
 
The didactic component of this module is to present the casuistical approach to moral dilemma 
resolution.  An indispensable reference is Rushworth Kidder’s How Good People Make Tough Choices 
(1996). In the previous module on Valuation, the Valuational Matrix was introduced.  It now becomes the 
basis for choosing among alternatives, upholding values in creative tension.  The emphasis here is on the 
act of choosing, distinguishing it from consequential, alternative and means-end cognitive activities or even 
lexical ordering.  Anticipate that the group may include a participant who, in the best tradition of William 
James, is concerned with the philosophical/ meta-psychological issue of free-will vs. determinism 
(Bricklin, 1999).  Neuro-biologically sophisticated persons may be aware of Libet’s problematic electro-
encephalographic findings revealing that action potential precedes awareness of choice (In: Libet, Freeman 
et al., 1999).  Adolescents may recount recent films dealing with 
this subject (e.g. Minority Report, 2002).  CST-Group TX: 6th Module          
Intrinsic Value: Freedom
• accountability
• matching privilege with responsibility
The discussion may be allowed to take such turns, but 
lengthy treatment of these subjects may detract from the more 
clinically relevant issue of psychopathological interference in 
agency and accountability.  A familiar pattern has been simply to 
engage in a discussion of the concept (if not the actual term) 
akrasia, arriving at an appreciation for the sense of such 
assessments as “I knew it was wrong but I did it anyway.”  In this 
vein, it is possible to lay emphasis upon phrases introduced by 
participants such as  “struggling with my conscience.”  
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The task for participants is to relate success experiences.  Each is to identify a moral event in 
which he or she has successfully resisted an urge to wrong-doing.  Each is to identify a moral event in 
which he or she overcame resistance to performing a good deed.  
Another exercise aims to enhance appreciation of agent-assisted 
internalization.  It involves Moral Imagination and the 
Valuational Triangle.  Participants are asked to predict which of 
their “A” moral mandates will become “S” moral mandates 
within a year.  Conversely, participants may be asked to identify 
which mandates are most likely to resist internalization.  The 
value matrix can then be applied to the mandate in question with 
the aim of fostering appreciation for the values upheld by the 
mandate and critical self-examination for the motives and reasons 
for keeping it at arm’s length. 
CST-Group TX: 6th Module          
Task
• successful resistance to an antisocial 
impulse
• overcoming resistance to a prosocial 
impulse
 
 
The Seventh Module: Delays in Conscience Formation and   
Psychopathologic Interference in Conscience Functions. 
 
Our groups have been heterogeneous with respect to diagnoses, 
conditions of advantage and conditions of adversity.  Yet 
participants have been able to engage with one another in 
identifying ways in which conscience can be strengthened and 
ways in which it can be weakened.  How does a person compose a 
morally meaningful life, one in which moral imagination is 
vibrant?  How does a person honor connectedness in the form of 
moralized attachments?  How does one attain equanimity and 
balance in moral emotional life?  How does a person become 
active in reconfiguring the valuation triangle?  How does one look 
beyond autonomy and even agency (with accountability its 
constant companion) to advocacy for others?  How does one go 
about the business of upholding the plurality of intrinsic values which conscience generates, especially 
when there is tension or conflict among them?  Participants have ideas about how to respond to these 
queries.  They have likely reflected, and possibly even expressed themselves already, on some or all of 
these questions as they emerged in the previous modules.  Through contrast and comparison with the 
individual consciences of peers and co-facilitators, or with the composite conscience of the group, they 
have to lesser or greater degree identified their own distinctive contours of conscience.  They have to lesser 
or greater degree appreciated that moral perspective and moral decision-making are markedly influenced by 
which contours are most salient.  Perhaps this or that participant has even made a beginning at appreciating 
the relative competencies and weaknesses residing among the domains of her or his individual conscience. 
CST-Group TX: 7th Module
• Developmental Delays 
– disruptive behavior disorders
– attention deficit hyperactive disorder
• Psychopathological Interferences
– depression
– post traumatic stress disorder 
– obsessive compulsive disorder
– substance abuse
 More specific comments will emerge out of the specific psychopathologic experiences of the 
participants.  Co-facilitators may find various approaches helpful.  One approach is simply to invite 
discussion as to how conscience can be mobilized with respect to substance abuse, maladaptive sexual 
behaviors, anger management, suicidality, and the like.  Another approach is to actually engage 
participants’ consciences directly, chiefly by means of previously described devices: valuational matrices 
and triangles.  A co-facilitator adopts the strategy of taking any psychiatric benchmark topic x, modifying 
it, and transforming it into a mandate (which may or may not be seen as moral).  A valuational matrix is 
constructed, allowing for the adumbration of best reasons and strongest motives for abiding by the 
mandate, and, on the other hand, for ignoring or resisting it.  For example, suicidality is rendered as the 
amoral mandate: “ Do engage in acts harmful to one’s self.”  The lower left hand cell is apt to fill up 
quickly with the flotsam and jetsam of depression, of maltreatment, of post-traumatic stress disorder, inter 
alia -- psycho-biological conditions that leave in their wake compromised or threatened conscience 
functions in the domains moral emotional responsiveness, valuation and volition.  Like effects of loss and 
disconnection upon moral attachment may be recorded, witnessed and validated here.   
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Supplemental Exercises. 
 
The facilitator of groups conducted in residential settings or school-term-long  day-programs may 
wish to coordinate efforts with the special education teachers5 in their settings.  Poe's Tell-Tale Heart has 
already been mentioned as lending itself to discussion in the module Moral Emotional Responsiveness.  
Younger group participants were asked to read or listen to The Thanksgiving Visitor (Capote, 1996) and 
select one of the three principal characters (Buddy, his Friend, or Odd), make inferences about the character 
as a person of conscience and discuss their ideas.  The filmed version of the 1960's musical Oliver!  also 
provides opportunities to make character studies (Oliver, Artful Dodger, Fagin, Sykes and Nancy) in terms 
of the domains of conscience and, in particular, potential trajectories from adverse events (loss, neglect, 
physical abuse, exposure to domestic violence) earlier and later in life.  For older children and adolescents 
we have used the film version rendered by Bille August from Victor Hugo's Les Misérables (1998) in the 
same manner.  
 
 
Conclusions and Limitations. 
 
  For the preliminary observations and reflections put forth in this study, the point of departure was 
consideration of the AACAP Practice Parameters for the Psychiatric Assessment of Children and 
Adolescents with respect to conscience formation and functioning.  In earlier work (Galvin et al, 2001), 
conscience sensitive interview technique and diagnostic formulation were characterized. Conscience 
sensitive interview technique and diagnostic formulation, respectively, have been proposed, as ways to 
conduct and understand psychiatric evaluations in accordance with the practice parameters. Recognizing 
that assessment is propaedeutic to treatment, the authors have posed these questions:  
 
1) Can conscience sensitive treatment be conducted in today's different mental health   
     environments?  
2) If so, what would it look like?  
3) Will it have universal applicability across the age-span of youth and the spectrum of          
     developmental psychopathology?  What about IQ considerations? 
4) What form(s)could/should parent or other adult involvement take? 
5) Does conscience sensitive treatment work? 
 
   
  Our response so far to question (1) is: 'Yes, conscience sensitive group psycho-educational therapy 
can be conducted in child adolescent psychiatric therapeutic loci ranging from outpatient to closed 
residential programs.'  However, constraining variables were encountered in the adolescent intensive 
outpatient program when census became large, and turnover rapid, in consequence of which the full cycle 
of seven modules conducted at a frequency of once per week could not be completed by many participants.  
This could be remedied by conducting sessions more frequently, perhaps two to three times per week, and 
offering a sufficient number of groups to ensure that the number of participants in each group does not 
exceed eight.  In the outpatient setting, there were fewer referrals than had been hoped, perhaps because of 
limitations upon reimbursement for the total number and/or kind of therapeutic interventions, a condition 
which, in our local mental health community and perhaps elsewhere, favors individual psychotherapy over 
group psychotherapy.  However, the possibility cannot be excluded that there have been referral biases or 
parental preferences in favor of groups with a more readily recognizable focus such as anger management 
or social skills over a novel, less familiar approach. 
In response to question (2), each of the seven modules in its current stage of development and 
refinement has been characterized in terms of praxis, but also considered critically in terms of treatment 
philosophy.    
Our impressionistic response to question  (3) is  'So far so good!' with respect to an age-span 
between 7 and 17 and psychiatric disorders of mood, anxiety, and behavior and, even schizophrenia after 
                                                          
5 In this regard, the author is indebted to Ms. Julie Noel and Ms. Sharon Tolle, both teachers in the 
Washington Township Metropolitan School District, Marion County, Indiana. 
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acute stabilization. With appropriate modifications, we envision applicability in children with 
developmental disorders and mild mental retardation.   
Regarding question (4), involvement of grown-ups, there are these considerations.  In the 
residential and day-school groups, the educator -clinicians engaged with other persons to examine 
conscience and seek out the intrinsic values that will govern strengthening exercises for each of its 
domains.  In these settings, there was participation in the group by youth care workers.  Staff were 
encouraged to adopt the conscience language and methods introduced in the group to engage the young 
persons of conscience in their charge on a one-to-one basis, to help them declare themselves intentionally, 
“I will do x as specified in my treatment plan for the sake of y”.  Assigned tasks emerging from these one-
to-one encounters may, for example, be applying a social skill for the sake of connectedness, practicing 
expressions of remorse for the sake of balance, accepting ‘unfair' consequences for ambiguous behavior for 
the sake of respecting authority, or, for the sake of autonomy, taking the next step towards a higher 
privilege level consonant with demonstrated responsibility.  One exciting possibility is to operate a parallel 
group for the grown-ups, parents or mentors, covering each module with a slant towards parenting or 
mentoring as the youth proceeds through the same module in the conscience sensitive psycho-educational 
group therapy format. This summer, we are beginning a pilot project that will involve first year medical 
students in their introduction to clinical medicine course pairing with children and adolescents in a 
residential program. As in past years, the medical students will be guided through parts of the I.U. 
Conscience Autobiography for Health Care Professionals (Gaffney et al, 2002). However in the anticipated 
pilot project, the medical students will have their discussions in tandem with key conscience sensitive 
psycho-educational group therapy modules conducted for the youth in residence.   
 
Question (5): How best to study outcome? The goal of psycho-education is to foster a better 
understanding of the nature of a psychological condition.  When the condition is subject to developmental 
delay and/or psychopathological interference, then there are additional goals to understand the nature of the 
disorder and its treatment.  Hence measurable outcomes from moral psycho-educational interventions could 
be obtained from testing the expansion of a person’s fund of knowledge with respect to the broad range of 
normal moral development and moral developmental psychopathology.  At a minimum, the educator might 
expect that a person could, in age-appropriate language, identify the domains of conscience and how 
conscience formation and conscience functioning might be affected by, for example, depression.  
Behavioral change can be measured.  It is notoriously difficult, however, to correctly attribute the 
behavioral change to a specific component of treatment. Gibbs et al (1995) make this point in their review 
of  “the most impressive study to date of the remediation of moral developmental delay” conducted by 
Arbuthnot and Gordon to evaluate their four month program entailing small-group discussions in 1986. 
While the experimental subjects of this study showed gains in both moral judgment and in behavior as 
measured by disciplinary referrals, tardiness, and grades, the techniques were multifaceted, promoting 
group cohesion, mutual caring and social skills training. The multifaceted approach relying upon integrated 
treatment modalities makes it hard to know which ingredient (or is it the blending of ingredients?) that is 
essential.  Indeed, the same study by Arbuthnot and Gordon, although its title, ‘Behavioral and cognitive 
effects of a moral reasoning development intervention for high-risk behavioral disordered adolescents,” 
indicates emphasis on the moral psychological domain, is adduced as evidence for the efficacy of cognitive 
problem solving skills training (Kazdin, 1987). A person’s profession that she changed her behavior “for 
the sake of x” can be characterized and staged. This could be accomplished by pre- and post- intervention 
use of one or another version of the SCI. The extent to which a behavioral change can be attributed to any 
expressed  “ for the sake of x”, to moral purpose, to best reasons as opposed to base motives is not so easily 
accounted. Moreover, given the possibility of sleeper effects, the benefit may not be easily detected in early 
measures of treatment outcome. Nonetheless, if possible, outcome should be studied, keeping in mind, that 
in part, what defines growth as a person of conscience is the deliberate effort she puts forth to make the 
highest values of which she is capable also her strongest motives.   
A final point: a persuasive argument might be made that a conscience sensitive approach, prima 
facie, adds value to any established treatment modality, be it psychodynamic, cognitive behavioral or 
interpersonal, be it in group or individual format. Together with an evidence-basis there is also an ethics 
basis for the practice of child and adolescent psychiatry. The educator-clinician practices transparently in 
accordance with professional healing values derived from the intrinsic values of conscience and 
transformed by the profession.  Desired outcomes for patients cannot be reached just any way at all; there 
are deontological constraints for even the most dyed-in-wool consequentialists among us.  Moreover, from 
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the ethical standpoint, some ways may be better than others, irrespective of the relative strength of their 
evidence bases. The benefit of conscience sensitive psychiatric treatment may not be discerned as readily in   
treatment outcome as in how a virtuous practice is shaped. 
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